Beijing redefined the global rules of power
China’s long term strategy paid off. The West never saw it coming
Frans Vandenbosch 方腾波 28.06.2025
Since the turn of the 21st century, China has not merely participated in global systems shaped by Western powers; it has decisively reconfigured them. From trade governance and civil aviation to financial infrastructure and multilateral diplomacy, Beijing has gradually but firmly outplaced key Western institutions with robust, functional, and inclusive alternatives. What was once dismissed as peripheral experimentation has now matured into viable leadership. China’s approach has not been one of confrontation but of strategic substitution, building a new international architecture that reflects the needs of the Global Majority rather than the imperatives of the so-called ‘rules-based order’.
The four case studies below (WTO, the United Nations, FAA/EASA aviation hegemony, and SWIFT-centred financial dominance) reveal a consistent pattern: the West’s failure to honour its own principles when challenged by a rising power, and China’s methodical creation of sovereign, legally grounded, and development-oriented alternatives. These are no longer proposals. They are operational, expanding, and widely endorsed across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and parts of Europe.
What follows is both analysis and evidence that the 21st century’s institutional centre of gravity is shifting, not violently, but confidently, from Washington and Brussels to Beijing.
Comparative table of global institutions
| Western Institution / Organisation | Successful Chinese Alternative |
| World Trade Organization (WTO) | Strategic WTO mastery + Belt and Road trade platform + BRICS trade councils |
| United Nations (UN) | BRICS+ multilateralism + Global Development / Security / Civilisation Initiatives |
| UN Security Council & Peacekeeping | China-led G77 diplomacy + BRICS mediation frameworks + PLA UNPK contributions |
| International Monetary Fund (IMF) | Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) + New Development Bank (NDB) |
| World Bank | AIIB + Silk Road Fund + China Development Bank (Global South focus) |
| SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication | CIPS Cross-Border Interbank Payment System + digital Renminbi (e-CNY) |
| EASA (EU Aviation Safety Agency) FAA (US Federal Aviation Administration) | Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) + COMAC C919 |
| Boeing / Airbus duopoly | COMAC C919 / CR929 (with Russia) + Belt and Road aviation corridors |
| G7 (Western economic coordination) | BRICS+ platform and summits |
| OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) | SCO + China-ASEAN frameworks + Belt and Road international forums |
| US-led sanctions regimes | Yuan-based trade, CIPS, bilateral non-dollar agreements, and digital RMB |
China’s outstanding & strategic WTO adventure: from compliance to leadership
When China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, it accounted for just 4 percent of global trade, while the United States dominated with 31 percent. Western leaders saw China’s accession as a strategic triumph, expecting it to surrender to neoliberal market norms. However, what unfolded was not China’s subordination, but its strategic mastery of a global system long weaponised for Western dominance.
At the heart of this broken Western promise lies paragraph 15(d) of China’s WTO accession protocol: “In any event, the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession.”
Source: WTO. Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, 2001 [i]
This clause clearly granted China automatic market economy status (MES) by December 2016. However, the United States and European Union unilaterally disregarded their commitment, while accusing China of unfair practices. Rather than weakening Beijing, this exposed Western duplicity and reinforced Chinese resolve to build alternative economic pathways.
President Xi Jinping reaffirmed China’s support for the WTO in 2023, calling it a pillar of multilateralism and a platform for global economic governance. Contrary to Western expectations, China used the WTO to strengthen rather than weaken itself. As one Shanghai banker aptly said in 2003, “this is a game we can win.” Two decades on, China has indeed won.
China’s accession came with harsher terms than any major developing economy. China had to:
- reduce tariffs on goods by 90 percent within seven years
- liberalise financial, telecommunications, professional and distribution services
- dismantle state monopolies and restructure legal systems at all levels
- accept sweeping foreign competition and implement rigorous intellectual property laws
- ensure trade policies were transparent and aligned with international standards
Despite concerns over job losses, the Chinese government led a comprehensive campaign to educate the public. Millions participated in WTO-related contests and training, and thousands of officials studied Western trade law.
Rather than becoming a passive participant, China transformed into a formidable litigant. Initially settling disputes to build experience, it soon began winning landmark cases, such as China–Auto Parts and Pneumatic Tires. Chinese firms and courts increasingly reference WTO law, while major companies like Huawei have developed elite legal teams exceeding Western standards.
While China has become a global standard-setter, the West now questions the WTO’s value. American reluctance stems not from systemic flaws, but from the realisation that China now plays by the rules better than its architects. The United States finds itself constrained, with few attractive alternatives. Technological stagnation, deindustrialisation and war have undermined its capacity to lead.
Meanwhile, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), mBridge, BRICS and new platforms for digital trade offer faster, fairer, more efficient systems under Chinese leadership. China has not only levelled the playing field but also written the rules and secured the gate.
As Godfree Roberts notes in his outstanding article China’s Excellent WTO Adventure,[ii] the era of Western-dominated trade is ending. China did not merely adapt to the global system. It mastered it, reshaped it, and now offers an inclusive alternative beyond the ‘golden billion’ model that has long extracted from the rest of the world.
China reshapes global governance as the United Nations falters
For decades, the United Nations, headquartered in New York, has stood as a symbol of international cooperation. However, its credibility and effectiveness have eroded, particularly in the Global South, where many states now view it as a paralysed institution disproportionately influenced by the West. Amid growing disillusionment, China has steadily built a new multilateral architecture rooted in mutual respect, sovereignty, and development. This is not an abrupt overthrow, but a gradual outplacement that commands increasing global legitimacy.
The dysfunctionality of the United Nations is not merely administrative but structural. Its Security Council, dominated by five permanent members, has been weaponised to serve geopolitical interests rather than global stability. In areas such as development, conflict resolution and equitable representation, the organisation has largely failed to deliver for the majority of the world’s population. Recognising this vacuum, China has built a pragmatic and inclusive framework around BRICS, which now acts as a parallel multilateral platform that increasingly outpaces the United Nations in relevance.
Originally a loose coalition of emerging economies, BRICS has evolved into a formidable geopolitical force. Under China’s consistent leadership, BRICS has expanded its influence and membership. As of 2025, BRICS+ includes a growing number of countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Collectively, they represent a majority of the world’s population and a rising share of global GDP. While the headquarters of the old system remain in New York, the functional centre of gravity has shifted towards Beijing-centred cooperation.
BRICS institutions are quietly absorbing functions once monopolised by the United Nations. The BRICS New Development Bank finances infrastructure and public development without the ideological strings typical of IMF and World Bank loans. In peace and security, China advocates political solutions based on regional dialogue and non-interference, often outside of the obstructed frameworks of the United Nations.
China’s Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilisation Initiative demonstrate an alternative model of global governance built on consensus, mutual learning, and practical cooperation. These initiatives have received wide support, with over 150 countries engaging with the Global Development Initiative alone. Rather than imposing a vision, China offers coordination and resources for shared progress. This approach increasingly resonates in the Global Majority, which is weary of Western conditionality and double standards.
Within the United Nations itself, China has gradually increased its influence. Chinese nationals lead several UN agencies, and Beijing is now the second-largest financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget. Through bloc diplomacy with the G77, Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group, China often steers outcomes in the General Assembly in favour of development-focused, multipolar policies. Yet, Beijing understands the structural limits of the existing system. Its strategy is not confrontation but circumvention.
In effect, a new United Nations is emerging: decentralised, multipolar, development-oriented, and rooted in the global South. While the old edifice in New York stands, it is China that is hosting the more functional, more equitable system of global governance.
For a wider geopolitical context, see “Why the Global Majority is backing China” by Professor Zhang Weiwei,[iii] available via China Daily.
China challenges aviation hegemony with the CAAC and COMAC’s C919
The global civil aviation industry has long been dominated by two Western giants: Boeing, overseen by the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and Airbus, certified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). Their regulatory regimes have, for decades, not only shaped global standards but also served as de facto gatekeepers, preserving Western monopoly over the skies. China, however, is steadily dismantling this duopoly through its own civil aviation authority, the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), and its indigenous aircraft manufacturer, the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC).
The COMAC C919, a narrow-body jet designed to compete with Boeing’s 737 and Airbus’s A320, represents a major inflection point. With over 1,000 orders already placed, primarily from Chinese airlines but also from international carriers, the C919 is not merely a technological achievement but a geopolitical statement. It signifies China’s determination to escape the technological dependency imposed by Western control of aviation supply chains and certification regimes.
The CAAC has emerged as a robust, internationally recognised regulator with growing influence. After successfully certifying the C919 in September 2022, the CAAC continues to expand bilateral aviation safety agreements with countries in Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and increasingly Central Asia. This is part of a wider effort to normalise non-Western regulatory pathways, reducing reliance on FAA and EASA approval as the sole validation of airworthiness.
Yet the West has not welcomed the C919 into global markets in good faith. Both the FAA and EASA have engaged in deliberate foot-dragging on C919 certification. While nominally citing procedural and safety grounds, the delay appears political, aimed at stalling market entry and protecting their respective national champions. This obstruction contrasts sharply with the rapid certification of Western models, often conducted in a spirit of mutual reciprocity. The double standards applied to the C919 are visible and increasingly challenged by other nations seeking aviation independence.
China’s response has been methodical and strategic. COMAC is deepening its cooperation with Russian and Global South aviation authorities to establish multilateral recognition of aircraft certifications. Furthermore, Chinese suppliers are rapidly indigenising the aircraft’s components. Although the first batch of C919 jets still incorporates some foreign systems, the long-term plan is to achieve 100% domestic content, including avionics, engines, and flight control systems.
China’s Belt and Road aviation strategy also strengthens COMAC’s position. Through airport construction, training programmes, and aircraft financing schemes, China is laying the foundation for C919 adoption in dozens of emerging economies. CAAC training centres in countries such as Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Thailand ensure that local aviation personnel are not only familiar with Chinese standards but also trained under CAAC protocols.
The aviation world is entering a multipolar era, and the days of FAA and EASA supremacy are numbered. The C919 is not just an aircraft; it is an emblem of technological sovereignty and multipolar aviation governance. It allows nations to break free from unilateral control and engage with China’s more inclusive, development-driven model of aerospace cooperation.
For a detailed overview of China’s civil aviation ambitions, see the Civil Aviation Administration of China’s official policy paper.[iv]
China outplaces SWIFT and US-dominated institutions with CIPS, AIIB and the BRICS bank
The global financial architecture has, for over seven decades, been shaped by institutions created and dominated by the United States and its Western allies. SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, headquartered in Belgium but under US influence, has functioned as a financial surveillance tool for the American empire. Similarly, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have operated with a clear Western bias, often imposing neoliberal policies on developing countries as a condition for assistance. China, through the gradual construction of parallel institutions and frameworks, is reshaping this outdated and unipolar financial order.
At the heart of this transformation lies the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), China’s answer to SWIFT. Unlike SWIFT, which merely transmits messages, CIPS integrates messaging and settlement, offering an end-to-end solution for cross-border transactions. Launched in 2015 and backed by the People’s Bank of China, CIPS has grown exponentially. By mid-2024, it was processing over CNY 180 trillion in annual transactions, with participation from more than 1 400 financial institutions across over 100 countries. Its expansion reflects growing discontent with the weaponization of SWIFT for sanctions and geopolitical coercion.
While CIPS is technically compatible with SWIFT, its strategic intent is clear: to bypass SWIFT when necessary and allow sovereign nations to transact in yuan without interference. This is particularly attractive to countries under Western sanctions, including Russia, Iran and Venezuela, as well as to BRICS nations and much of the Global South, who see CIPS as a means of protecting economic autonomy. As the digital renminbi (e-CNY) matures and integrates with CIPS, the potential to displace SWIFT’s monopoly grows ever more real.
In parallel, China has built a powerful constellation of development finance institutions that rival the Bretton Woods order. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established in 2016 with over 100 member countries, has emerged as a key lender for sustainable development projects, often prioritising infrastructure, green energy, and regional connectivity over the ideological prescriptions of the World Bank. The AIIB’s governance structure reflects a fairer voting system, with China’s shareholding aligned to its economic weight but without the domineering veto power held by the US in the World Bank.
China is also a leading member and co-founder of the New Development Bank (NDB), often referred to as the BRICS bank. Headquartered in Shanghai, the NDB offers an alternative to Western-dominated finance, with local currency lending and equity participation designed to empower national development strategies. The Africa-focused African Development Bank (AfDB) and the long-standing Asian Development Bank (ADB) have also seen increasing cooperation with Chinese institutions, signalling a coordinated shift away from IMF dependency.
Together, these institutions represent more than financial tools; they are vehicles for a new model of development, one based on mutual respect, sovereignty, and win–win cooperation. As the Global South continues to assert itself, China’s leadership in financial governance is no longer aspirational; it is operational and expanding.
For more detail, consult the official CIPS site.[v]
Conclusion
China has not dismantled the Western-led global order with confrontation, but replaced it through quiet strength, strategic consistency, and inclusive alternatives. From trade and diplomacy to aviation and finance, the institutions that once underpinned Western hegemony are now mirrored and in many regions, outperformed by Chinese-led structures. This is not a passing phase but a permanent shift. The Global Majority is no longer looking to Washington or Brussels, but to Beijing for leadership grounded in sovereignty, development, and fairness. What was once a Western monopoly on standards and systems has been broken. China now offers the world a different kind of order, one that is not enforced, but welcomed. The age of Western dominance is ending. The age of balanced multipolarity has begun.
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Dit artikel in het Nederlands: Beijing herschrijft de wereldwijde regels van de macht
Endnotes:
[i] WTO. Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, 2001 – Full text available here: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/L/432.pdf
[ii] Godfree Roberts. Here comes China. China’s Excellent WTO Adventure 02.10.2023 https://herecomeschina.substack.com/p/chinas-excellent-wto-adventure
[iii] Professor Zhang Weiwei: “Why the Global Majority is backing China” in China Daily.
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202312/18/WS65801f36a310efcbdaeca234.html
[iv] China’s civil aviation ambitions, the Civil Aviation Administration of China’s official policy paper:
http://www.caac.gov.cn/en/XWZX/202212/P020221219406263302563.pdf
[v] official CIPS site: http://www.cips.com.cn/en/index.html
